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Abstract
This paper presents a bimodal logic for reasoning about knowledge
during knowledge acquisition. One of the modalities represents (effort
during) non-deterministic time and the other represents knowledge. The
semantics of this logic are tree-like spaces which are a generalization of
semantics used for modeling branching time and historical necessity. A
finite system of axiom schemes is shown to be canonically complete for
the formentioned spaces. A characterization of the satisfaction relation
implies the small model property and decidability for this system.
1 Introduction
The notion of possible world dominates the literature in modal logic, via Kripke
models, as well as in any logic dealing with the epistemic state of a reasoner. The
heart of this popularity lies in the identification of an intentional state through
common properties of extensional objects. Apart from genuine problems such
as logical omniscience this representation suffers from, it is limited in a static
description of the reasoner’s epistemic state. The “logic of knowing” is not only
embodied in the representation of knowledge but also in the way knowledge is
acquired. We do not refer to temporal properties but rather to methodology
(though both can be intertwined).
Recently a family of logics was introduced ([MP92],[Geo94a],[Geo93],[DMP])
with the intention to fill this void. It succeeds in doing so by attaching familiar
mathematical structures such as spaces of subsets, topologies and complete lat-
tices of subsets corresponding to a natural knowledge acquisition. This paper
extends this work by introducing a bimodal logic belonging to the same family
of logics and establishes a correspondence between a particular epistemic pro-
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cess of knowledge acquisition with a space of subsets forming a tree (treelike
space).
In our framework the view of a reasoner will be represented by a set of
possible worlds. Each of these worlds represents an alternative state compatible
with the reasoner’s knowledge of actual state. This treatment of knowledge
agrees with the traditional one ([Hin62], [HM84], [PR85], [CM86]) expressed
in a variety of contexts (artificial intelligence, distributed processes, economics,
etc).
We are interested in formulating a basic logical framework for reasoning
about a resource-conscious acquiring of knowledge. Such a framework can be
applied to many settings such as the ones involving time, computation, phys-
ical experiments or observations. In these settings an (discrete or continuous)
increase of information available to us takes place and results in an increase of
our knowledge. How could this simple idea be embodied in the formentioned
semantical framework? An increase of knowledge can be represented with a
restriction of the knower’s view, i.e. of the equivalence class of the alternative
worlds. This restriction is nondeterministic (we do not know what kind of ad-
ditional information will be available to us, if at all) but not arbitrary: it will
always contain the actual state of the knower, i.e. it is a neighborhood restriction
of the actual state. In this way, set-theoretic considerations come in.
A discrete version of our epistemic framework can arise in scientific exper-
iments or tests. We acquire knowledge by “a step-by-step” process, each step
being an experiment or test. The outcome of such an experiment or test is
unknown to us beforehand, but after being known it restricts our attention
to a smaller set of possibilities. A sequence of experiments, tests, or actions
comprises a strategy of knowledge acquisition. This model is in many respects
similar to Hintikka’s “oracle” (see [Hin86]). In Hintikka’s model the “inquirer”
asks a series of questions Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn, . . . to an external information source,
called “oracle” (can be thought as a knowledge base). The oracle answers yes
or no and the inquirer increases his or her knowledge by this piece of additional
evidence. At any point of this process the inquirer follows a branch of a tree
determined by the possible answers to his or her series of questions. Such an
interrogative model is recognized by Gadamer ([Gad75]) as an important part
of the epistemic process. Consider the following example:
Example: Suppose that our view, the set of possible worlds, is {q1, q2, q3, q4}
and our query consists of two questions Q1, Q2, in that order. The answer to
Q1 is yes in q1, q2 and no in q3, q4. The answer to Q2 is yes in q1, q2, q3 and
no in q4. Then the possible sequences of knowledge states comprise a tree of
subsets as shown in Figure 1. The space of subsets labeling the nodes of the
tree will be called a treelike space.
The above example shows a transition from the symbolic description of the
epistemic process to a description in spatial terms. Instead of going down a
proof tree, the one which entails the desired formulae, we intersect nodes of a
tree labeled by subsets of a space. This transition is direct; it enables us to
think in geometric terms.
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Figure 1: A knowledge acquisition tree.
Now consider the following example:
Example: Suppose that a machine emits a stream of binary digits representing
the output of a recursive function f . After time t1 the machine emitted the
stream 111. The only information we have about the function being computed
at this time on the basis of this (finite) observation is that
f(1) = f(2) = f(3) = 1.
As far as our knowledge concerns, f is indistinguishable from the constant func-
tion 1, where 1(n) = 1 for all n. After some additional time t2, i.e. spending
more time and resources, 0 might appear and thus we could be able to distin-
guish f from 1. In any case, each binary stream will be an initial segment of
f and this initial segment is a neighborhood of f . In this way, we can acquire
better knowledge of the function the machine computes. The space of finite
binary streams is a structure which models computation. The sets of binary
streams under the initial segment ordering is an example of a treelike space.
The above example shows how the same epistemic process appears during
observations of programs. Here possible worlds correspond to (total) computa-
tions and our view to observations. We can apply the same spatial reasoning to
programs through the following correspondence:
Knowledge states = Sets = Observations
Possible worlds = Points = Computations.
Therefore a common idea lies behind the knowledge-theoretic, spatial and
computational framework. The connection between the last two is not new.
Here is how this epistemic framework ties with previous work on establishing
links between spatial reasoning and reasoning about programs.
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We use two modalities K for knowledge and ✷ for effort, i.e. spending of
resources. Consider the formula
A→ ✸KA,
where A is an atomic predicate and ✸ is the dual of the ✷, i.e. ✸ ≡ ¬✷¬. It
will be clear after the presentation of semantics in Section 2.1 that if the above
formula is valid, then the set which A represents is an open set of the topology
generated by the subsets of the treelike space as a basis. Under the reading of
✸ as “possible” and K as “is known”, the above formula says that
“if A is true then it is possible for A to be known”,
i.e. A is affirmative. Vickers defines similarly an affirmative assertion in [Vic89]
“an assertion is affirmative iff it is true precisely in the circumstances
when it can be affirmed.”
Affirmative and refutative assertions are closed under infinite disjunctions and
conjunctions, respectively. Smyth in [Smy83] observed first these properties in
semi-decidable properties. Semi-decidable properties are those properties whose
truth set is r.e. and are a particular kind of affirmative assertions. In fact,
changing our power of affirming or computing we get another class of properties
with a similar knowledge-theoretic character. For example, using polynomial
algorithms affirmative assertions become polynomially semi-decidable, i.e. NP
properties. If an object has this property then it is possible to know it with a
polynomial algorithm even though it is not true we know it now.
Our approach has an independent theoretical interest. A new family of
Kripke frames, called subset frames, arises. These are Kripke frames which are
equivalent to sets of subsets. In particular, we have identified those which are
equivalent to (complete) lattices of subsets and topologies (see [Geo93]). In
this paper, we shall identify those which correspond to the above interrogative
model, called treelike spaces. Treelike spaces have a particular interest; they
correspond to an indeterminist’s theory of time called Ockhamism (see [Pri67]),
which gives rise to branching time. We refer the reader to section 2.1 for a
detailed discussion.
A family of logics for knowledge and time is studied in [HV89] and various
complexity results are established. However, the framework of the above logics
is restricted to distributed systems and their interpretation differs significantly
from ours.
Interpreting the knowledge modal operator as a universal quantifier we
present a novel way of understanding the meaning of quantifiers in varying
(ordered) domains (see section 2.2 for a relevant discussion). This is one of the
main difficulties in formulating a meaningful first-order system for modal logic
(see [Fit93] for a discussion).
The language and semantics of our logical framework is presented in Sec-
tion 2. In the same section, we present two systems which belong to the same
family of logics, studied in [MP92], [Geo93] and [Geo94a]. In Section 3, we
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present an axiomatization, called MPT, for our semantics and we prove com-
pleteness, small model property, and decidability.
A preliminary version of this paper has appeared in [Geo94b].
2 Two Systems: MP and MP∗
2.1 Language and Semantics
We follow the notation of [MP92].
We construct a bimodal propositional modal logic. Formally, we start with
a countable set A of atomic formulae, then the language L is the least set such
that A ⊆ L and closed under the following rules:
φ, ψ ∈ L
φ ∧ ψ ∈ L
φ ∈ L
¬φ,✷φ,Kφ ∈ L
We abbreviate, as usual, φ ∧ ¬φ with ⊥ and ¬⊥ with ⊤. The language L
can be interpreted inside any spatial context as follows.
Definition 1 Let X be a set and O a subset of the powerset of X , i.e.
O ⊆ P(X) such that X ∈ O. We call the pair 〈X,O〉 a subset space. A model is
a triple 〈X,O, i〉, where 〈X,O〉 is a subset space and i a map from A to P(X)
with i(⊤) = X and i(⊥) = ∅ called initial interpretation.
We denote the set {(x, U) : U ∈ O, and x ∈ U} ⊆ X ×O with X×˙O. For
each U ∈ O let ↓U be the lower closed set generated by U in the partial order
(O,⊆), i.e. the set {V : V ∈ O and V ⊆ U}.
Definition 2 The satisfaction relation |=M, whereM is the model 〈X,O, i〉,
is a subset of (X×˙O)×L defined recursively by (we write x, U |=Mφ instead of
((x, U), φ) ∈ |=M)
x, U |=MA iff x ∈ i(A), where A ∈ A
x, U |=Mφ ∧ ψ if x, U |=Mφ and x, U |=Mψ
x,U |=M¬φ if x, U 6 |=Mφ
x, U |=MKφ if for all y ∈ U, y, U |=Mφ
x, U |=M✷φ if for all V ∈ ↓U such that x ∈ V, x, V |=Mφ.
If x, U |=Mφ, for all (x, U) belonging to X×˙O, then φ is valid inM, denoted by
M|=φ.
The case for atomic formulae shows that we deal with analytic sentences,
i.e. sentences which do not change their truth value. If a formula ✷φ does not
contain K then it has the same interpretation as φ. This has also the consequence
that the universal substitution rule does not hold. Thus, time does not affect
the semantic value of sentences but rather the knowledge we have of them. This
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difference makes the ✷modality not collapsing to a temporal modality but being
closer to necessity.
We abbreviate ¬✷¬φ and ¬K¬φ with ✸φ and Lφ respectively. We have that
x, U |=MLφ if there exists y ∈ U such that y, U |=Mφ
x, U |=M✸φ if there exists V ∈ O such that V ⊆ U, x ∈ V, and x, V |=Mφ.
Definition 3 A treelike space is a subset space 〈X,O〉 where for all U, V ∈ O,
either U ⊆ V , or V ⊆ U , or U ∩ V = ∅. A model induced by a tree space will
be called a treelike model.
It is clear that in the countable case the set of subsets of a treelike space
forms a tree under the subset ordering.
Example: Let
X = {f | f recursive }.
Now, let
[a1, a2, . . . , an] = {f | f(k) = ak, for k = 1, 2, . . . , n} ⊆ X,
where a1, a2, . . . , an are natural numbers, and
O = {[a1, a2, . . . , an] | n = 1, 2, . . .} ∪ {X}.
Then it is easily verified, using definition 2.1, that 〈X,O〉 is a treelike space.
Now let 1 be a predicate with
i(1) = {f | there exists n such that for all m > n, f(n) = 1}.
Then the formula
✷L1
which translates to “it will never be known that 0 appears infinitely often”, is
valid in the treelike model 〈X,O, i〉. This comes with no surprise, since the
knowledge of “infinitely often” requires an infinite amount of resources. This
formula is an example of a refutative assertion (see introduction).
Treelike spaces get their name from treelike frames (see [Pri67]). A tree-
like frame is a pair 〈T,<〉, where T is a nonempty set and < is a transitive
ordering on T such that if t1 < t and t2 < t then either t1 = t or t1 < t2
or t2 < t1. Treelike frames have appeared as semantics for the Ockhamist’s
concept of non-deterministic time and been used for treating historical neces-
sity and conditionals (see [Tho84] and [VF81]). The validity on these frames is
called Ockhamist validity. A treelike space is a special form of a treelike frame
where the temporal instants of the frame are labeled by subsets of a space and
whenever instants are incomparable the respective subsets are disjoint. It can be
easily seen that the ordering among subsets is a treelike frame. The similarities
do not end here. Let 〈T,<〉 be a treelike frame and, for each t ∈ T , Bt the set of
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maximal linear ordered subsets of T containing t, i.e. the branches intersecting
t. Then {Bt}t∈T is a treelike space. The difference lies on the interpretation of
atomic formulae. We interpret atomic formulae on branches while an Ockhamist
assignment interprets atomic formulae on temporal instances. This bring up an-
other dimension of our logic. Our logic is not conservative over a logic which
interprets ✷ as F (the “future” modality) for if φ contains no occurrences of K
then ✷φ is valid in a treelike space exactly when φ is. We adopt the indeter-
minist’s view of necessity (knowledge). Although φ may be true in our world,
Kφ may be false. This is because there is no special world in our view which
deserves to be called actual. Setting apart Ockhamist validity, treelike spaces
are more general than treelike frames (and their derivative T ×W frames) due
to the fact that we do not assume an overall temporal ordering. In this sense
treelike spaces are closer to a more general structure, first introduced by Kamp
and subsequently called Kamp frames, where worlds do not participate in the
same temporal structure (for definition and discussion see [Tho84]). In fact, it
is easily seen that treelike spaces are equivalent to Ockhamist frames introduced
by Zanardo in [Zan85] for the completeness of strong Ockhamist validity. At any
rate, our work seems to have more than superficial links with work in historical
necessity and questions such as what the connections between the two notions
of validity are should be the subject of a more systematic investigation.
2.2 MP and MP∗
We saw that the semantics of the bimodal language is interpreted in any pair
〈X,O〉. What happens when we allow O to be any class of sets of subsets? If O
is an arbitrary set of subsets then the system MP is complete for such subset
spaces. The axiom system MP consists of axiom schemes 1 through 10 and
rules of Table 1 (see page 9) and appeared first in [MP92].
The following was proved in [MP92].
Theorem 4 The axioms and rules of MP are sound and complete with respect
to subset spaces.
If O is a complete lattice under set-theoretic union and intersection then the
system MP∗ is canonically complete for this class of subset spaces. The axiom
system MP∗ consists of the axiom schemes and rules of MP plus the following
two additional axiom schemes:
✸✷φ→ ✷✸φ
and
✸(Kφ ∧ ψ) ∧ L✸(Kφ ∧ χ)→ ✸(K✸φ ∧✸ψ ∧ L✸χ).
The first axiom is a well-known formula which characterizes incestual frames,
i.e. if two points β and γ in a frame can be accessed by a common point α
then there is a point δ which can be accessed by both β and γ. The second
characterizes union.
The following was proved in [Geo93].
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Theorem 5 The axioms and rules of MP∗ are sound and canonically complete
with respect to subset spaces, which are complete lattices.
The proof of the above theorem was later shortened and improved through
an elegant embedding of S4 (and therefore intuitionistic logic via the Go¨del
translation) by Dabrowski, Moss and Parikh in [DMP]. This translation reveals
that truth in intuitionistic logic coincides with “possibility of knowing” in our
system. It also reveals a connection with another line of work, that of Fischer
Servi. In [FS80] and [FS84] the semantics and syntax of the family ∗-IC of
intuitionistic modal logics is studied. This family is is naturally embedded via
the Go¨del translation to the family (S4-∗) of bimodal logics, where S4 is always
one of the coordinates (like in our case). However, the semantics called double
model structures (birelational modal frames) deviate from our space theoretic
framework; a fact that declares itself on the presence of different connecting
axioms, i.e. axioms involving both modalities.
3 The system MPT
We add the axioms 11 and 12 to form the system MPT for the purpose of
axiomatizing treelike spaces.
A word about the axioms (most of the following facts can be found in any in-
troductory book about modal logic, e.g. [Che80] or [Gol87].) Axiom 2 expresses
the fact that the truth of atomic formulae is independent of the choice of subset
and depends only on the choice of point. Axioms 3 through 5 and Axioms 6
through 9 are used to axiomatize the normal modal logics S4 and S5 respec-
tively. The former group of axioms expresses the fact that the passage from one
subset to its restriction is done in a constructive way, as actually happens in an
increase of information or a spending of resources (the classical interpretation
of necessity in intuitionistic logic is axiomatized in the same way). The latter
group is generally used for axiomatizing logics of knowledge.
Axiom 10 expresses the fact that if a formula holds in arbitrary subsets is
going to hold as well in the ones which are neighborhoods of a point. The
converse of this axiom is not sound.
Axiom 11 is a well-known axiom which characterizes reflexive, transitive and
connected frames, i.e. if two points β and γ in a frame can be accessed by a
common point α then either β accesses γ or γ accesses β (or both).
Soundness of Axioms 1 through 10 has already been established for arbitrary
subset spaces (see [MP92]). The soundness of Axiom 11 is easy to see, since the
subset frame (see [Geo93]), i.e. the birelational modal frame, of a tree model is
connected.
Proposition 6 The axiom 12 is sound.
Proof. We shall show soundness for the equivalent formula
✷Kφ ∧✸L(ψ ∧ ✷φ)→ L(✸ψ ∧ ✷φ).
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Axioms
1. All propositional tautologies
2. (A→ ✷A) ∧ (¬A→ ✷¬A), for A ∈ A
3. ✷(φ→ ψ)→ (✷φ→ ✷ψ)
4. ✷φ→ φ
5. ✷φ→ ✷✷φ
6. K(φ→ ψ)→ (Kφ→ Kψ)
7. Kφ→ φ
8. Kφ→ KKφ
9. φ→ KLφ
10. K✷φ→ ✷Kφ
11. ✷(✷φ→ ψ) ∨ ✷(✷ψ → φ)
12. ✷Kφ ∧ K(✷φ→ ✷ψ)→ ✷K(✷φ→ ✷ψ)
Rules
φ→ ψ, φ
ψ
MP
φ
Kφ
K-Necessitation
φ
✷φ
✷-Necessitation
Table 1: Axioms and Rules of MPT.
Let x, U |=✷Kφ ∧✸L(ψ ∧ ✷φ). Then there exists V ⊆ U such that x, V |=L(ψ ∧
✷φ). This implies that there exists y ∈ V such that y, V |=ψ∧✷φ. Now, observe
that y, U |=✷φ. For, if W ⊆ U and y ∈ W then there are two cases. Either
W ⊆ V and y,W |=φ, since y, U |=✷φ, and we are done, or W ⊆ U and W 6⊆ V
so we have V ⊆ W ⊆ U , since the subsets containing y are linearly ordered.
In this case, we have x ∈ W , since x ∈ V . By our assumption x, U |=✷Kφ,
we have x,W |=Kφ. So y,W |=φ. Now, y ∈ U and y, U |=✷φ imply together
y, U |=✸ψ ∧ ✷φ.
Note that Axiom 10 follows from Axiom 12 (substitute φ with ⊤). Axiom 10
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has a particular interest; if we replace K with the universal quantifier it becomes
the well-known Barcan formula
∀x✷φ(x)→ ✷∀xφ(x).
Our system (and therefore MP and MP∗, since this formula belongs to their
axiomatization) can be thought as a propositional analogue of a first order modal
system interpreted over varying restricting domains (see [Fit93]).
3.1 Completeness
Our proof of completeness is based on a construction of a treelike model which
is (strongly) equivalent to each generated canonical submodel of the canonical
model of MPT.
The canonical model of MPT is the structure
C =
(
S, {
✸
→,
L
→}, v
)
,
where
S = {s ⊆ L|s is MPT-maximal consistent},
s
✸
→ t iff {φ ∈ L|✷φ ∈ s} ⊆ t,
s
L
→ t iff {φ ∈ L|Kφ ∈ s} ⊆ t,
v(A) = {s ∈ S|A ∈ s},
along with the usual satisfaction relation (defined inductively):
s|=CA iff s ∈ v(A)
s|=C¬φ iff s 6 |=Cφ
s|=Cφ ∧ ψ iff s|=Cφ and s|=Cψ
s|=C✷φ iff for all t ∈ S, s
✸
→ t implies t|=Cφ
s|=CKφ iff for all t ∈ S, s
L
→ t implies t|=Cφ.
We write C|=φ, if s|=Cφ for all s ∈ S.
A canonical model exists for all consistent bimodal systems with the normal
axiom scheme for each modality (as MPT). We have the following well known
theorems (see [Che80], or [Gol87]).
Theorem 7 (Truth Theorem) For all s ∈ S and φ ∈ L,
s|=Cφ iff φ ∈ s.
Theorem 8 (Completeness Theorem) For all φ ∈ L,
C|=φ iff ⊢MPT φ.
We shall now prove some properties of C.
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Proposition 9 a. The canonical frame is reflexive, transitive and connected
with respect to the relation
✸
→.
b. The relation
L
→ is an equivalence relation.
c. For all s, s′, t ∈ S, if s
✸
→ s′
L
→ t then there exists t′ ∈ S such that
s
L
→ t′
✸
→ t.
d. For all s, s′ ∈ S, if s
L
→ s′ and s
✸
→ s′ then s = s′.
e. The relation
✸
→ is antisymmetric.
Proof. For Part a, Axioms 3 through 5 and Axiom 11 characterize reflexive,
transitive and connected frames (these axioms comprise the system S4.3).
For Part b, K is axiomatized with the S5 axioms.
Part c is an immediate consequence of Axiom 10.
To show Part d, let
Is,s′ = {t | s
✸
→ t
✸
→ s′},
for all pairs (s, s′) such that s
L
→ s′ and s
✸
→ s′.
We shall prove by induction on the complexity of φ that, for all pairs (s, s′)
such that s
L
→ s′ and s
✸
→ s′, φ belongs to some t ∈ Is,s′ if and only if φ belongs
to s. This shows that
⋃
Is,s′ ⊆ s. Further, we have Is,s′ = {s}, since s ∈ Is,s′ .
Therefore s = s′.
If φ is an atomic formula A and A ∈ t, for some t ∈ Is,s′ , then ✸A ∈ s.
Therefore, by axiom 2, ✷A ∈ s. Hence, A ∈ s.
The cases of negation and conjunction are straightforward.
If φ = ✷ψ, let ✷ψ ∈ t, for some t ∈ Is,s′ . In particular, ψ ∈ t and by
induction hypothesis, ψ ∈ s. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that ✸¬ψ ∈ s.
Then there exists r ∈ S such that s
✸
→ r and ¬ψ ∈ r. Since the frame is
connected, s
✸
→ s′ and s
✸
→ r imply that either s′
✸
→ r or r
✸
→ s′. If s′
✸
→ r
then t
✸
→ r which is contradiction, since ✷ψ ∈ t and ¬ψ ∈ r. If r
✸
→ s′ then,
by induction hypothesis, ¬ψ ∈ s which is a contradiction, since ψ ∈ s and s is
consistent. Hence ✷ψ ∈ s.
If φ = Kψ, let Kψ ∈ t for some t ∈ Is,s′ . Suppose, towards a contradiction,
that L¬ψ ∈ s. Then there exists r ∈ S such that s
L
→ r and ¬ψ ∈ r. We have
s′
L
→ r, since s′
L
→ s. Since t
✸
→ s′, there exists, by Part c, r′ ∈ S such that
t
L
→ r′
✸
→ r. We have ψ ∈ r′, since Kψ ∈ t. Since s
✸
→ t
L
→ r′, there exists, by
Part c, r′′ ∈ S such that s
L
→ r′′
✸
→ r′. Notice that r′′
✸
→ r′
✸
→ r and r′′
L
→ r,
and so r′′, r′, r ∈ Ir′′,r. By our previous assumption, we have ¬ψ ∈ r and ψ ∈ r′.
By induction hypothesis on Ir′′,r, both ¬ψ and ψ should belong to r′′ which is
a contradiction to its consistency.
For Part e, we shall prove by induction on the structure of φ that, for all
s, t ∈ S such that s
✸
→ t
✸
→ s, φ ∈ s if and only φ ∈ t.
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The cases of atomic formula, negation, conjunction and ✷ are straightfor-
ward. We shall show the φ = Kψ step. Let Kψ ∈ s, and suppose L¬ψ ∈ t
towards a contradiction. Then there exists r ∈ S such that t
L
→ r and ¬ψ ∈ r.
Since s
✸
→ t
L
→ r, there exists p ∈ S such that s
L
→ p
✸
→ r. Also, ψ ∈ p, since
Kψ ∈ S. Now, since t
✸
→ s
L
→ p there exists r′ ∈ S such that t
L
→ r′
✸
→ p. This
implies r′
✸
→ p
✸
→ r and r
L
→ r′. Therefore, by Part d, r = r′. Thus we have
r
✸
→ p
✸
→ r with ¬ψ ∈ r and ψ ∈ p which is a contradiction to the induction
hypothesis.
The canonical model is not a (model corresponding to a) treelike model.
A counterexample will appear later on (see Figure 2). However, by defining a
number of equivalence relations, we shall be able to construct a treelike model
equivalent to each generated part of the canonical model.
For all t ∈ S, let [t] = {s ∈ S | s
L
→ t}, i.e. the equivalence class under
L
→
where t belongs. Let CK = {[t] | t ∈ S}. We define the following relation on CK.
[t1] ≤ [t2] iff there exist s1, s2 ∈ S such that s1 ∈ [t1], s2 ∈ [t2] and s2
✸
→ s1.
Proposition 10 The relation ≤ is a partial order.
Proof. Since t
✸
→ t, we have [t] ≤ [t] and reflexivity follows.
For antisymmetry, let [t1] ≤ [t2] and [t2] ≤ [t1] for some t1, t2 ∈ S. Then
there exist s1, s2, s
′
1, s
′
2 ∈ S such that s1, s
′
1 ∈ [t1], s2, s
′
2 ∈ [t2], s2
✸
→ s1 and
s′1
✸
→ s′2. Since s2
✸
→ s1
L
→ s′1, there exists s
′′
2 ∈ S such that s2
L
→ s′′2
✸
→ s′1. So
we have s′′2
✸
→ s′1
✸
→ s′2 and s
′′
2
L
→ s′2 which implies, by Proposition 9(d), s
′′
2 = s
′
2.
Therefore s′1 = s
′
2, by
✸
→’s antisymmetry. Hence [t1] = [s′1] = [s
′
2] = [t2].
For transitivity, let [t3] ≤ [t2] ≤ [t1] for some t1, t2, t3 ∈ S. Then there exist
s1 ∈ [t1], s2, s′2 ∈ [t2], and s3 ∈ [t3] such that s1
✸
→ s2 and s′2
✸
→ s3. Since
s1
✸
→ s2
L
→ s′2, there exists s
′
1 ∈ S such that s1
L
→ s′1
✸
→ s′2. So s
′
1
✸
→ s3, and
therefore [t3] = [s3] ≤ [s′1] = [t1].
A subset X of S, the domain of the canonical model C, is called K✷-closed
whenever
if s ∈ X, and s
✸
→ t or s
L
→ t, then t ∈ X.
The intersection of K✷-closed sets is still K✷-closed, therefore we can define the
smallest K✷-closed containing t, for all t ∈ S. We shall denote this set by St.
Fix t0 ∈ S. We define the model
Ct0 =
(
St0 ,
✸
→ |St0×St0 ,
L
→ |St0×St0 , v
t0
)
,
where
✸
→ |St0×St0 ,
L
→ |St0×St0 and v
t0 are the restrictions of
✸
→,
L
→ and v to
St0 × St0 and St0 respectively. We shall call this model the submodel of C
generated by t0.
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Observe that if we restrict the partial order ≤ to Ct0 then [t0] is the greatest
element under ≤.
For each generated submodel of the canonical model, we shall construct a
treelike model which is equivalent to it.
For each s ∈ St0 , let
[[s]] = {t ∈ [t0] | there exists t
′ ∈ [s] such that t
✸
→ t′}.
Notice that [[s]] ⊆ [t0].
For each s ∈ St0 , we define the following relation ∼s on [[s]]
t1 ∼s t2 iff for all [s] ≤ [s
′], t1 ∈ [[s
′]] iff t2 ∈ [[s
′]].
Proposition 11 For all s ∈ St0 , the relation ∼s is an equivalence relation.
Proof. This is because ∼s inherits the properties of
L
→.
We denote the equivalence class of t under ∼s with [t]s. We have [t]s ⊆ [[s]] ⊆
[t0].
Let 〈X,Ot0〉 be the subset space where
X = {t | t ∈ [t0]}
and
Ot0 = {[t]s | t ∈ [[s]] and s ∈ S
t0}.
It is clear that Ot0 ⊆ P(X).
Lemma 12 If [s1] ≤ [s2] and t ∈ [[s1]] ∩ [[s2]] then [t]s1 ⊆ [t]s2 .
Proof. Immediate from the definition of ∼s .
To elaborate the above process, we present the following simple example.
Example: A part of the canonical model appears in Figure 2. (Horizontal and
downward arrows correspond to
L
→ and
✸
→, respectively.) We would like to
make subsets of a treelike space correspond to equivalence classes under
L
→.
Canonical model worlds related with
✸
→ will be represented by a single point.
However, this model is not a treelike model: {r1, t1} and {r3, s1, t1} should make
two distinct points. To remedy that, we “trace back” each equivalence class
under
L
→ to the uppermost one. For instance, [t1] = {t1, t2} is traced back to
[r1] = {r1, r2, r3, r4}. The latter forms [[t1]]. Next, we split [[t1]] into equivalence
classes under ∼t1 , i.e. [r1]t1 = {r1, r2} and [r3]t1 = {r3, r4}, since r1 ∼t1 r2
and r3 ∼t1 r4. Finally, we replace [t1] with as many copies as these equivalence
classes (see Figure 3). The infinite case is taken care of by Lemma 14. The
resulting space (of Figure 3) is a treelike space. Note that we could have replaced
this procedure by one that employs maximal branches but we find the present
one simpler.
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Figure 2: A generated submodel of the canonical model.
Proposition 13 The subset space 〈X,Ot0〉 is a treelike space.
Proof. Suppose [t1]s1 ∩ [t2]s2 6= ∅. Let t ∈ [t1]s1 ∩ [t2]s2 . We have either
s1
✸
→ s2 or s2
✸
→ s1, since t
✸
→ s′1, t
✸
→ s′2, for some s
′
1 ∈ [s1] and s
′
2 ∈ [s2],
and the canonical frame is connected. The former implies [s1] ≤ [s2]. Thus, by
Lemma 12, [t1]s1 = [t]s1 ⊆ [t]s2 = [t2]s2 . Similarly, the latter implies [t]s2 ⊆ [t]s1 .
Let 〈X,Ot0 , i〉 be the treelike model where X and Ot0 are as above, and
i(A) = vt0(A) where vt0 is the initial interpretation restricted on Ct0 .
An element of X×˙Ot0 can have more than one representation. In order to
prove the semantical equivalence we are opting for, we shall choose a canonical
representation. So, given a pair (t, [t′]s′) ∈ X×˙Ot0 , its canonical representation
is (t, [t]s) where s is such that t
✸
→ s
L
→ s′. Its existence is assured by the
definition of [t′]s′ and uniqueness by Proposition 9(d). From now on, we shall
use the canonical representation wherever is possible.
Lemma 14 Let t ∈ [t0] and s ∈ St0 such that t
✸
→ s. Then for all s′ ∈ [s] there
exists t′ ∈ [t0] such that t′
✸
→ s′ and t ∼s t′, i.e. t′ ∈ [t]s.
Proof. Let
{ti}i∈I
be the linear order of all members of St0 under
✸
→ such that t
✸
→ ti
✸
→ s.
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Figure 3: The treelike model corresponding to Figure 2
Now, let
T ′ = {✸ψ | ψ ∈ s′}
∪ {χ | Kχ ∈ t}
∪ {✸ω | Kω ∈ ti, for some i ∈ I}
∪ {✷φ | ✷Kφ ∈ t and ✷φ ∈ s′}.
T ′ is consistent. For if not, then there would be ψ, ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn, χ, φ as above
with i1, i2, . . . , in ∈ I and i1 ≤ i2 ≤ . . . ≤ in such that
⊢MPT ✸ψ ∧
n∧
k=1
✸ωk ∧ χ→ ✸¬φ.
Thus
⊢MPT K
(
✸ψ ∧
n∧
k=1
✸ωk ∧ χ→ ✸¬φ
)
.
We shall prove that the negation of the above formula belongs to t and reach a
contradiction. Since ψ ∧✷φ ∈ s′, we have L(ψ ∧ ✷φ) ∈ s. Hence
✸L(ψ ∧ ✷φ) ∈ ti1 .
Observe that ✷Kφ ∈ ti1 so, by applying axiom 12, we have
L(✸ψ ∧ ✷φ) ∈ ti1 .
Since Kω1 ∈ ti1 , we have
L (✸ψ ∧ ω1 ∧✷φ) ∈ ti1 .
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Also, ✷Kφ ∈ ti2 and
✸L (✸ψ ∧ ω1 ∧ ✷φ) ∈ ti2 .
So, by axiom 12,
L (✸(✸ψ ∧ ω1) ∧✷φ) ∈ ti2 .
Since Kω2 ∈ ti2 , we have
L (✸ψ ∧ ω2 ∧✸ω1 ∧ ✷φ) ∈ ti2 .
Also, ✷Kφ ∈ ti3 and
✸L (✸ψ ∧ ω2 ∧✸ω1 ∧ ✷φ) ∈ ti3 .
So, by axiom 12,
L (✸(✸ψ ∧ ω2 ∧✸ω1) ∧ ✷φ) ∈ ti3 ,
i.e.
L (✸ψ ∧✸ω2 ∧✸ω1 ∧ ✷φ) ∈ ti3 .
Arguing this way and by repeated applications of axiom 12 we have
L
(
✸ψ ∧
n∧
k=1
✸ωk ∧✷φ
)
∈ t.
Since Kχ ∈ t, we have
L
(
✸ψ ∧
n∧
k=1
✸ωk ∧ χ ∧ ✷φ
)
∈ t
which is the negation of the formula that MPT proves. Therefore T ′ is consis-
tent. Let t′ be a maximal extension of T ′.
We shall show that t′ is the required theory of the lemma. We begin by
showing that if t′
✸
→ r′
✸
→ s′ then r′
L
→ ti, for some i ∈ I, i.e. t ∈ [[r
′]]. So
suppose that t′
✸
→ r′
✸
→ s′. If r′ = s′ we are done. If not, let
R = {ψ | ✷ψ ∈ t} ∪ {Lχ | χ ∈ r′}.
R is consistent. For if not, then there would be ψ and χ as above such that
⊢MPT ψ → ¬Lχ.
Since r′
✸
→ s′ and r′ 6= s′, there exists χ′ ∈ r′ such that ✷¬χ′ ∈ s′. Let
φ = χ ∧ χ′. Observe that ✷¬(χ ∧ χ′) ∈ s′, i.e. ✷¬φ ∈ s′, and φ ∈ r′. Further,
⊢MPT ψ → ¬L(χ ∧ χ
′),
i.e.
⊢MPT ψ → ¬Lφ,
16
and therefore,
⊢MPT ✷ψ → ✷K¬φ.
Now, we have ✷K¬φ ∈ t and ✷¬φ ∈ s′, since ✷ψ ∈ t. By definition of T ′ above,
we have ✷¬φ ∈ T ′, and therefore ✷¬φ ∈ t′ (t′ is an extension of T ′). In this
case, ¬φ ∈ r′ which is a contradiction. Therefore R is consistent. So a maximal
extension r of R has the property t
✸
→ r
✸
→ s. Hence r = ti, for some i ∈ I.
We must now prove that t′ ∈ [[ti]], for all i ∈ I. Let
T ′i = {ψ | ✷ψ ∈ t
′} ∪ {ω | Kω ∈ ti}.
T ′i is consistent. If not, then
⊢MPT ψ → ¬ω,
for some φ and ω as above, which implies
⊢MPT ✷ψ → ✷¬ω,
i.e.
⊢MPT ✷ψ → ¬✸ω.
So ¬✸ω ∈ t′, since ✷ψ ∈ t′. But, by definition, ✸ω ∈ T ′ ⊆ t′ which is a
contradiction. Therefore a maximal extension t′i of T
′
i is such that t
′ ✸→ t′i
L
→ ti.
Hence t′ ∈ [[ti]].
Combining the above proofs we have t ∼s t′.
We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 15 For all s ∈ St0 and t ∈ X such that t
✸
→ s,
φ ∈ s iff t, [t]s|=φ.
Proof. By induction on the structure of φ. For an atomic formula A, we have
that t ∈ i(A) if and only if s ∈ i(A) = vt0(A), i.e. A ∈ s, because of Axiom 2
and t
✸
→ s.
Negation and conjunction are straightforward.
Suppose φ = ✷ψ. Let ✷ψ ∈ s and t, [t]s|=✸¬ψ, for some s and t as in
the theorem’s statement. This implies that there exists s′ ∈ St0 such that
[t]s′ ⊆ [t]s, t
✸
→ s′ and t, [t]s′ |=¬ψ. By induction hypothesis, ¬ψ ∈ s′. We
have now that t
✸
→ s and t
✸
→ s′ which, by connectivity, implies either s′
✸
→ s
or s
✸
→ s′. In the former case, we have [s] ≤ [s′] and hence, by Lemma 12,
[t]s ⊆ [t]s′ . So [t]s = [t]s′ . Therefore s = s′, by Proposition 9(d), which is a
contradiction to our hypothesis (φ ∈ s). In the latter case, we have s
✸
→ s′
which again contradicts our hypothesis (φ ∈ s).
For the other direction, suppose that t, [t]s|=✷ψ and ✸¬ψ ∈ s for some s
and t as above. Then there exists s′ ∈ St0 such that s
✸
→ s′ and ¬ψ ∈ s′. Thus,
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t, [t]s′ |=¬ψ by induction hypothesis. Moreover [t]s′ ⊆ [t]s by Lemma 12, which
is a contradiction.
If φ = Kψ, let Kψ ∈ s and suppose t, [t]s|=L¬ψ, for some s and t as in
the theorem’s statement, towards a contradiction. Then there exists t′ ∈ [t]s
such that t′, [t]s|=¬ψ, i.e. t′, [t′]s′ |=¬ψ, for some s′ ∈ St0 such that t′
✸
→ s′ and
s′
L
→ s, which is a contradiction.
For the other direction, suppose that t, [t]s|=Kψ and L¬ψ ∈ s, for some s
and t as above. Then there exist s′ ∈ St0 such that s
L
→ s′ and ¬ψ ∈ s′. By
Lemma 14, there exists t′ ∈ [t]s such that t′
✸
→ s′. Then we have t′, [t]s|=¬ψ by
induction hypothesis. Therefore t, [t]s|=¬Kψ which is a contradiction.
Combining now Proposition 13 and Theorem 15 we have the following
Corollary 16 The system MPT is complete with respect to treelike spaces.
3.2 Decidability
For each treelike model and formula φ, we shall construct an equivalent finite
subset space of bounded size with respect to the complexity of φ. This is a kind
of “semantic” filtration, based on geometric properties of treelike models, using
a technique first introduced in [Geo94a].
In the following we assume that 〈X,O〉 is a treelike space. Our aim is to
find a partition of O, where a given formula φ “retains its truth value” for each
point throughout a member of this partition. It turns out that there exists a
finite partition of this kind.
First we need some definitions. (Note that the following hold, although we
refer to a treelike space O, for an arbitrary family of subsets of X .)
Definition 17 Given a finite family F = {U1, . . . , Un} ⊆ P(X), i.e. of subsets
of X , we define the remainder of (the principal ideal in (O,⊆) generated by)
Uk by
Rem
FUk = ↓ Uk −
⋃
Uk 6⊆Ui
↓ Ui,
where ↓Uk = {V ∈ O | V ⊆ Uk}. Note that Rem
FUk ⊆ O (but not necessarily
Uk ∈ O).
Proposition 18 In a finite family F = {U1, . . . , Un} ⊆ P(X) closed under
intersection, we have
RemFUi = ↓ Ui −
⋃
Uj⊂Ui
↓ Uj ,
for i = 1, . . . , n.
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Proof.
RemFUi = ↓Ui −
⋃
Ui 6⊆Uh
↓Uh
= ↓Ui −
⋃
Ui 6⊆Uh
↓(Uh ∩ Ui)
= ↓Ui −
⋃
Uj⊂Ui
↓Ui.
We denote
⋃
Ui∈F
↓Ui with ↓F .
Proposition 19 If F = {U1, . . . , Un} is a finite family of subsets of X closed
under intersection then
a. RemFUi ∩ Rem
FUj = ∅, for i 6= j,
b.
⋃n
i=1 Rem
FUi = ↓F , i.e. {Rem
FUi}ni=1 is a partition of ↓F . From now
on we shall call a finite family of subsets F closed under intersection a
finite partition (of ↓F),
c. if V1, V2 ∈ O, V1 ∈ Rem
FUi and V1 ⊆ V2 ⊆ Ui then V2 ∈ Rem
FUi, i.e.
RemFUi is convex,
d. if {Vj}j∈J ⊆ Rem
FUi then
⋃
j∈J Uj ⊆ Ui.
Proof. Parts a, c and d are immediate from the definition.
For Part b, suppose that V ∈ ↓F then V ∈ RemF
⋂
V ∈↓Ui
Ui.
Every partition of a set induces an equivalence relation on this set. The mem-
bers of the partition comprise the equivalence classes. We denote the equivalence
relation induced by F by ∼F .
Definition 20 Given a set of subsets G, we define the relation ∼′G on O with
V1 ∼′G V2 if and only if V1 ⊆ U ⇔ V2 ⊆ U for all U ∈ G.
We have the following
Proposition 21 The relation ∼′G is an equivalence.
Proposition 22 Given a finite partition F , we have ∼′F=∼F i.e. the remain-
ders of F are the equivalence classes of ∼′F .
Proof. Suppose V1 ∼′F V2 then V1 and V2 belong to Rem
FU where
U =
⋂
{U ′|V1, V2 ⊆ U, U
′ ∈ F}.
For the opposite direction, suppose V1, V2 ∈ Rem
FU and there exists U ′ ∈ F
such that V1 ⊆ U ′ while V2 6⊆ U ′. Then we have V1 ⊆ U ′ ∩ U , U ′ ∩ U ∈ F and
U ′ ∩ U ⊆ U i.e. V1 6∈ Rem
FU .
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Proposition 23 If G is a finite set of subsets of X then Cl(G), its closure under
intersection, is a finite partition for ↓G.
The last proposition enables us to give yet another characterization of re-
mainders: every family of points in a complete lattice closed under arbitrary
joins comprises a closure system, i.e. a set of fixed points of a closure operator of
the lattice (cf. [GHK+80].) Here the lattice is the powerset of X . If we restrict
ourselves to a finite number of fixed points then we just ask for a finite set of
subsets closed under intersection i.e. Proposition 23. Thus a closure operator in
the lattice of the powerset of X induces an equivalence relation to any family of
subsets of X . Two subsets are equivalent if they have the same closure, and the
equivalence classes of this relation are just the remainders of the subsets which
are fixed points of the closure operator.
We now introduce the notion of stability corresponding to what we mean by
“a formula retains its truth value on a set of subsets”.
Definition 24 Let G ⊆ O then G is stable for φ, if for all x, either x, V |=φ
for all V ∈ G, or x, V |=¬φ for all V ∈ G.
Proposition 25 Let G1,G2 ⊆ O then
a. if G1 ⊆ G2 and G2 is stable for φ then G1 is stable for φ, and
b. if G1 is stable for φ and G is stable for χ then G1 ∩ G2 is stable for φ ∧ χ.
Proof. Part a is easy to see while Part b is a corollary of Part a.
Definition 26 A finite partition F = {U1, . . . , Un} is called a stable partition
for φ, if RemFUi is stable for φ, for all Ui ∈ F .
Proposition 27 If F = {U1, . . . , Un} is a stable partition for φ, so is
F ′ = Cl({U0, U1, . . . , Un}),
where U0 ∈ ↓F .
Proof. Let V ∈ F ′, then there exists Ul ∈ F such that Rem
F ′V ⊆ RemFUl
(e.g. Ul =
⋂
{Ui|Ui ∈ F , V ⊆ Ui}), i.e. F ′ is a refinement of F . But Rem
FUl is
stable for φ and so is RemF
′
V by Proposition 25(a).
The above proposition says that a finite stable partition for a treelike space
O remains stable if we “refine” it.
The following is the main theorem of this section. It says that for each
formula φ we can find a stable partition for φ which is essentially a refinement
of the stable partition corresponding to the subformulae of φ.
Theorem 28 (Partition Theorem) Let M = 〈X,O, i〉 be a treelike model.
Then there exists a family {Fψ}ψ∈L of finite stable partitions such that if φ is
a subformula of ψ then Fφ ⊆ Fψ and Fψ is a finite stable partition for ψ.
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Proof. By induction on the structure of the formula ψ. In each step we refine
the partition of the induction hypothesis. For each U ∈ Fψ , let Uψ = {x ∈
U : x, U |=ψ}. This set determines completely the satisfaction of ψ on RemF
ψ
U
whenever Fψ is stable.
• If ψ = A is an atomic formula then FA = {X} = {i(⊤)}, since O is stable
for all atomic formulae. We have XA = i(A).
• If ψ = ¬φ then let Fψ = Fφ, since the statement of the theorem is
symmetric with respect to negation. We also have Uψ = (X − Uφ) ∩ U ,
for all U ∈ Fψ.
• If ψ = χ ∧ φ, let
Fψ = Cl(Fχ ∪ Fφ).
Observe that Fχ ∪ Fφ ⊆ Fχ∧φ. Now, Fψ is a stable partition for χ ∧ φ
containing X , since it is a refinement of both Fχ and Fφ. Thus, Fψ is a
finite stable partition for ψ containing X .
• Suppose ψ = Kφ. Then, by induction hypothesis, there exists a finite
stable partition Fφ = {U1, . . . , Un} for φ containing X .
Now, if V ∈ RemF
φ
Ui∩↓U
φ
i , for some i ∈ {1. . . . , n}, then x, V |=φ, for all
x ∈ V , by definition of Uφi . Hence x, V |=Kφ, for all x ∈ V .
On the other hand, if V ∈ RemF
φ
Ui − ↓U
φ
i then there exists x ∈ V such
that x, V |=¬φ (otherwise V ⊆ Uφi ). Thus we have x, V |=¬Kφ, for all
x ∈ V . Hence RemF
φ
Ui ∩ ↓U
φ
i and Rem
FφUi − ↓U
φ
i are stable for Kφ.
Thus the set
F = {RemFUi| U
φ
i 6∈ Rem
FUi}∪
{RemFUj − ↓U
φ
j ,Rem
FUj ∩ ↓U
φ
j | U
φ
j ∈ Uj}
is a partition of O and its members are stable for Kφ. Let
FKφ = Cl(Fφ ∪ Uφi ).
We have that FKφ is a finite set of opens and Fφ ⊆ FKφ. Thus FKφ
is finite and contains X . We have only to prove that FKφ is a stable
partition for Kφ, i.e. every remainder of an open in FKφ is stable for Kφ.
But for that, observe that FKφ is a refinement of F . Therefore FKφ is a
finite stable partition for Kφ, using Proposition 25(a).
Now, if U ∈ Fψ then either UKφ = U or UKφ = ∅.
• Suppose ψ = ✸φ. Then, let
F✸φ = Fφ,
where Fφ is a finite stable partition for φ by induction hypothesis.
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We shall show that Fφ is also a finite stable spitting for ✸φ. Pick U ∈ Fφ
and x ∈ U . If x, V |=¬φ, for all V ⊆ U such that x ∈ V , we are done,
since x, V |=¬✸φ. If x, V |=φ, for some V ∈ RemF
φ
U , then x,W |=φ, for
all W ∈ RemF
φ
U , since Fφ is stable for φ. Therefore x,W |=✸φ for all
W ∈ RemF
φ
U . If x, V |=φ, for some V ⊆ U with V 6∈ RemF
φ
U , then we
have V ⊆ W , for all W ∈ RemF
φ
U , since the set of subsets containing x
is linearly ordered and RemF
φ
U is stable and convex. Hence x,W |=✸φ,
for all W ∈ RemF
φ
U .
The following corollary is “folklore”.
Corollary 29 The formula ✷✸φ→ ✸✷φ is sound in treelike spaces.
Proof. Let x, U |=✷✸φ in some model 〈X,O, i〉.
By the Partition theorem, there exists a finite stable partition F for φ.
Further, there is a V ∈ F which is “the least” in the following sense: if W,W ′ ∈
O contain x, W ∈ RemFV , and W ′ ⊆W then we will also have W ′ ∈ RemFV .
The existence of such a set V is assured by the fact that F is finite, the members
of the partition which F induces are convex, and the set of subsets in O which
contain x is linearly ordered. Moreover, RemFV contains at least one subset
which contains x, say W .
Now, we have either U ⊆ V or V ⊆ U . In the former case, we have
U ∈ RemFV . Hence x, U |=✷φ as RemFV is stable for φ. In the latter case,
x,W |=✸φ, since W ⊆ V ⊆ U . Thus we have x,W |=✷φ for the same reasons as
above. Hence x, U |=✸✷φ.
A finite partition does not have a treelike form. Therefore we cannot perform
a filtration in a direct manner. First, we shall consider no partition member
(remainder) that contains no subset belonging to the initial treelike space. Next,
we shall impose a relation ≤ among the remaining members (Definition 3.2).
Two remainders will be related just in case they contain subsets with common
elements. This relation is not a partial order. However, it respects the initial
treelike ordering (Lemma 32 through 35). Finally, using a number of equivalence
relations based on ≤, one for each member of the partition, we shall construct a
treelike model equivalent to the initial one (Propositions 38 and 39). Moreover,
the underlying space of this model will contain a finite number of subsets.
By the Partition theorem, given a treelike model 〈X,O, i〉 and a formula φ,
there exists a finite partition Fφ on O stable for φ. For each U ∈ Fφ, let
U =
⋃
RemF
φ
U
and
Fφ =
{
U | U ∈ Fφand U 6= ∅
}
.
We have the following
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Lemma 30 If U1, U2 ∈ Fφ with U1 ⊂ U2, and V1, V2 ∈ O with V1 ∈ Rem
FφU1,
V2 ∈ Rem
FφU2 and V1 ∩ V2 6= ∅, then V1 ⊂ V2.
Proof. Since V1 ∩ V2 6= ∅, then, by connectedness, we have either V1 ⊆ V2
or V2 ⊆ V1. If V1 ⊆ V2 then V1 ⊂ V2 since they belong to distinct equivalence
classes. If V2 ⊆ V1 then we have V2 ⊆ V1 ⊆ U1 ⊆ U2. Hence V1 ∈ Rem
FφU2, by
Proposition 19(c).
Definition 31 Let < be the following relation on Fφ
U1 < U2 iff U1 ∩ U2 6= ∅, and
for all x, V1, V2 such that x ∈ U1 ∩ U2, V1 ∈ Rem
FφU1 with x ∈ V1,
and V2 ∈ Rem
FφU2 with x ∈ V2, V1 ⊂ V2.
Clearly, we cannot have U1 < U2 and U2 < U1. Let U1 ≤ U2, if either
U1 = U2 or U1 < U2.
The following lemma allows us to weaken the conditions of the definition of
<.
Lemma 32 Let U1, U2 ∈ Fφ with U1 6= U2. If there exist x ∈ U1 ∩ U2 and
V1 ∈ Rem
FφU1, V2 ∈ Rem
FφU2 with x ∈ V1 ∩ V2 such that V1 ⊂ V2, then
U1 < U2.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that for y ∈ U1 ∩ U2 there exist
W1 ∈ Rem
FφU1 and W2 ∈ Rem
FφU2 such that y ∈ W1 ∩W2 and W2 ⊆W1. By
our hypothesis, U1 6= U2 and V1 ⊂ V2, and so we have U2 6⊆ U1. This implies
that RemF
φ
U2 ∩ ↓U1 = ∅. Therefore W2 6∈ Rem
FφU2 which is a contradiction.
Thus W1 ⊂W2. Hence U1 < U2.
Lemma 33 Let U1, U2 ∈ Fφ. If U1 ∩ U2 6= ∅ then U1 ≤ U2 or U2 ≤ U1.
Proof. Suppose that U1 6= U2 and let x ∈ U1 ∩ U2. Let V1 ∈ Rem
FφU1 and
V2 ∈ Rem
FφU2 such that x ∈ V1∩V2. Since O is a treelike space, we have either
V1 ⊆ V2 or V2 ⊆ V1. Suppose that the former holds. Since U1 6= U2, we have
V1 ⊂ V2. By Lemma 32, U1 < U2. Similarly, if V2 ⊆ V1 then U2 < U1.
Lemma 34 ≤ is reflexive and antisymmetric.
Proof. Reflexivity is straightforward. For antisymmetry, suppose that U1 ∩
U2 6= ∅, U1 ≤ U2 and U2 ≤ U1. If U1 6= U2 then we have U1 < U2 and U2 < U1
which is a contradiction.
Instead of transitivity, we have the following property of ≤:
Lemma 35 Let U1, U2, U3 ∈ Fφ. If U1 ≤ U2, U2 ≤ U3 and U1 ∩ U2 ∩ U3 6= ∅
then U1 ≤ U3.
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Proof. If either U1 = U2 or U2 = U3 we are done, so suppose that U1 < U2
and U2 < U3. Let x ∈ U1 ∩ U2 ∩ U3, V1 ∈ Rem
FφU1 and V3 ∈ Rem
FφU3 such
that x ∈ V1 and x ∈ V3. Since x ∈ U2, there exists V2 ∈ Rem
FφU2 such that
x ∈ V2. Also, we have V1 ⊂ V2 ⊂ V3, since U1 < U2 and U2 < U3. So, by
Lemma 32, U1 < U3.
Since Fφ ⊆ Fφ, Fφ is finite. Let Fφ = {U1, U2, . . . , Un}, for some n. Now,
let ∼i be the following equivalence relation on Ui
x ∼i y iff for all Uj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that Ui ≤ Uj ,
x ∈ Uj iff y ∈ Uj .
We denote the equivalence of x under ∼i with [x]i. Observe that the number
of equivalence classes is finite, since it depends only on the number of members
of the partition.
Lemma 36 Let Uk, Ul ∈ Fφ, k, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, with Uk ∩ Ul 6= ∅. Then
a. if Uk ≤ Ul then [x]k ⊆ [x]l , for all x ∈ Uk ∩ Ul, and
b. if [x]k ⊂ [x]l, for some x ∈ Uk ∩ Ul, then Uk < Ul.
Proof. For Part a, if Uk = Ul then we are done. Suppose Uk < Ul and let
z ∈ [x]k. Let Um ∈ Fφ, m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, be such that Ul ≤ Um. If x ∈ Um
then x ∈ Uk ∩ Ul ∩ Um. So, by Lemma 35, Uk ≤ Um. So z ∈ Um, since x ∼i z.
For the other direction, suppose z ∈ Um. Then we have z ∈ Ul, since Uk ≤ Ul
and x ∼1 z. So z ∈ Uk ∩ Ul ∩ Um. Hence, by Lemma 35, Uk ≤ Um. Also,
x ∈ Um, since x ∼i z. Therefore z ∈ [x]l.
For Part b, we have either Uk < Ul or Ul ≤ Uk, since Uk ∩ Ul 6= ∅. Suppose
the latter towards a contradiction. Then, by Part a and Lemma 33, we have
[x]l ⊆ [x]k which is a contradiction to our hypothesis.
Lemma 37 Let Uk, Ul ∈ Fφ, k, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, with Uk ∩ Ul 6= ∅. If Uk < Ul
then [x]k ⊂ [x]l, for all x ∈ Uk ∩ Ul.
Proof. By Lemma 36(a), we have [x]k ⊆ [x]l. Suppose [x]k = [x]l. Let
V ∈ RemF
φ
Ui such that x ∈ V . We have V ⊆ [x]i. Thus V ⊆ [x]j ⊆ Uj .
So, for each y ∈ V , there exists Vy ∈ Rem
FφUj such that Vy ⊂ V . But then
V =
⋃
y∈V Vy ∈ Rem
FφUj which is a contradiction, since Ui 6= Uj.
Now, let
[Fφ] = {[x]i | x ∈ Ui, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}}.
Proposition 38 The subset space 〈X, [Fφ]〉 is a treelike space.
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Proof. First notice that X ∈ Fφ, since X ∈ Fφ. Thus X = Ui0 , for some
i0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Moreover, x ∼i0 y, for all x, y ∈ X . Hence X = [x]i0 ∈ [F
φ].
Now, let [x]i ∩ [y]j 6= ∅, for some x ∈ Ui and y ∈ Uj . Let z ∈ [x]i ∩ [y]j . We
have [x]i = [z]i and [y]j = [z]j . Further, z ∈ Ui and z ∈ Uj , i.e. Ui ∩ Uj 6= ∅.
So, by Lemma 33, we have either Ui ≤ Uj or Uj ≤ Ui. By Lemma 36(a), we
have either [z]i ⊆ [z]j or [z]j ⊆ [z]i, respectively. Therefore either [x]i ⊆ [y]j or
[y]i ⊆ [x]j .
Let M = 〈X, [Fφ], i〉 be the treelike model where i(A) = {[x]i | x ∈ i(A)}.
Proposition 39 For all x ∈ X, V ∈ O and ψ ∈ L such that ψ is a subformula
of φ, if V ∈ RemF
φ
Ui, for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, then
x, V |=Mψ iff x, [x]i|=Mψ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ. The only interesting case is that
of φ = ✷ψ. Suppose x, [x]i|=✸¬ψ but x, V |=M✷ψ, for some V ∈ Rem
FψUi.
The latter implies that there is j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that x, [x]j |=¬ψ and
[x]j ⊆ [x]i. We have x, [x]i|=ψ, by x, V |=Mψ and induction hypothesis. Hence
[x]j ⊂ [x]i. By Lemma 36(b), we have Uj < Ui. By induction hypothesis,
we have x, V ′|=M¬ψ, for all V
′ ∈ RemF
ψ
Uj such that x ∈ V ′. Also, we have
V ′ ⊂ V , since Uj < Ui. Hence x, V |=M¬ψ, a contradiction.
Now, suppose x, [x]i|=✷ψ but x, V |=M✸¬ψ, for some V ∈ Rem
FψUi. So
there exists V ′ ∈ RemF
ψ
Uj such that x ∈ V ′, V ′ ⊆ V , and x, V ′|=M¬ψ. Also,
x, [x]i|=ψ so, by induction hypothesis, x, V |=Mψ. The latter implies Ui 6= Uj ,
since RemF
ψ
Ui is stable for ψ. Therefore we have Uj < Ui. Hence, by Lemma 37,
[x]j ⊂ [x]i. Thus x, [x]j |=¬ψ, by induction hypothesis. Hence x, [x]i|=✸¬ψ, a
contradiction to our hypothesis.
Constructing the above model is not adequate for generating a finite model,
since there may still be an infinite number of points. It turns out that we only
need a finite number of them.
Let M = 〈X,O, i〉 be a treelike model, and define an equivalence relation ∼
on X by x ∼ y iff
1. for all U ∈ O, x ∈ U iff y ∈ U , and
2. for all atomic A, x ∈ i(A) iff y ∈ i(A).
Further, denote by x∗ the equivalence class of x, and let X∗ = {x∗ : x ∈ X}.
For every U ∈ O, let U∗ = {x∗ : x ∈ U}, then O∗ = {U∗ : U ∈ O} is a
treelike space on X∗. Define a map i∗ from the atomic formulae to the powerset
of X∗ by i∗(A) = {x∗ : x ∈ i(A)}. The entire model M lifts to the model
M∗ = 〈X∗,O∗, i∗〉 in a well-defined way.
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Lemma 40 For all x, U , and φ,
x, U |=Mφ iff x
∗, U∗|=M∗φ .
Proof. By induction on φ.
Theorem 41 If φ is satisfied in any treelike space then φ is satisfied in a finite
treelike space.
Proof. Let M = 〈X,O, i〉 be such that, for some x ∈ U ∈ O, x, U |=Mφ.
Let Fφ be a finite stable partition (by Theorem 28) for φ and its subformulae
with respect to M. By Proposition 39, x, U |=Nφ, where N = 〈X,F , i〉. We
may assume that F is a treelike space, and we may also assume that the overall
language has only the (finitely many) atomic symbols which occur in φ. Then
the relation ∼ has only finitely many classes. So the model N ∗ is finite. Finally,
by Lemma 40, x∗, U∗|=N∗φ.
Observe that the finite treelike space is a quotient of the initial one under two
equivalences. The one equivalence is on the elements of the treelike space and
the number of equivalence classes is a function of the complexity of φ. The other
equivalence is on the points of the treelike space and the number of equivalence
classes is a function of the atomic formulae appearing in φ. So the overall size of
the (finite) treelike space is bounded by a function of the complexity of φ. Thus
if we want to test if a given formula is invalid we have a finite number of finite
treelike spaces where we have to test its validity. Thus we have the following
Theorem 42 The theory of treelike spaces is decidable.
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